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DEA Based Yardstick Competition in Natural Resource Management 




In this paper, we discuss the pros and cons of using Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) to evaluate and enhance the efficiency of natural resource management. The 
need for a multi-dimensional production frontier approach is sketched, along with 
examples from other regulated multi-output industries. Also, reviews of the basic 
properties of DEA and DEA based yardstick competition are provided. Finally, we 
discuss the use of DEA based yardstick to evaluate bids in multi-dimensional 
procurement auctions. 
 
Keywords: Regulation, Incentives, Performance Evaluation, Auctions, Yardstick 
Competition, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
 
1. Introduction 
  Data Envelopment Analyses (DEA) has become a tremendously popular relative 
performance evaluation tool. It was first proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978,79). A recent bibliographic survey (www.deazone.com) identified more than 
1000 papers from all sectors of society, including several studies within agriculture, 
forestry, and fishery. Many of these have been published in high quality economics, 
management science and operations research journals. 
  Regulators soon realized the usefulness of DEA. DEA studies have for many 
years been informing their decision making. More recently, DEA has also been used 
more directly (or mechanically) to define regulatory incentives. In particular, it has 
been used in incentive regulation of energy utilities. For example, in the regulation of 
electricity distribution, countries like Norway ( www.nve.no ),  Holland ( www.dte.nl 
), and Finland ( www.energiamarkkinavirasto.fi ) have introduced DEA based revenue 
and price cap systems. Furthermore, DEA has  – together with more traditional 
statistical methods  – been used to determine reasonable cost norms in countries like 
Australia, England, New Zealand and Sweden. 
  Given this trend, it is natural to discuss the potential use of DEA in the 
regulation of natural resource management. This is the aim of the present paper. To 
the best of our knowledge, there has been no formalized regulation of natural resource 
management using DEA. 
  Farmers and forest owners produce  – and use  - environmental goods like 
recreation, clean ground water and habitats for indigenous plants and animals. 
However, as no conventional market exists for these goods, the unregulated 
production levels are presumably below their social optima. A private farmer or forest 
owner is likely to prioritise the production of marketable goods, e.g. corn or timber. 
Environmental regulation plays an important role in trying to  correct this market 
failure, one of the means being subsidies. Subsidies are usually granted on a flat-rate 
basis, say per acre, or they are determined from assessments of opportunity costs. Due 
to asymmetric information, the better-informed farmers and forest owners will usually 
extract information rents. Part of the problem in environmental regulation is therefore,   2
to limit these rents. Relative performance evaluation using for example DEA may be 
an important tool for just such a purpose. 
  In this paper,  we discuss when and how DEA based relative performance 
evaluations can support the regulator. 
  DEA can be used to model costs and can hereby assist in the design of an ex-
ante regulation, i.e. a system where subsidies are based on past data. Ex-ante systems 
like “CPI-x-x
i”, where the compensation over the years is increased by a (consumer) 
price index (CPI) and decreased by the general productivity development (x), as well 
as possibly the individual improvement (x
i), are commonly used in many sectors. 
DEA c an assist in the determination of the general and individual productivity 
developments, x and x
i. 
  DEA can also be used in an ex-post regulation, where the additional information 
acquired during the regulation period, is used to set reasonable costs. The principle 
here is that the ex-ante commitment to ex-post regulation effectively creates a pseudo-
market among the agents, each of which is trying to do at least as well as the others. 
  DEA can finally support procurement design. While both ex-ante and ex-post 
regulation seeks to reduce the costs of producing given outputs, the focus in 
procurement is on the choice of agents (to operate in a market), as well as their 
multiple dimensional output vectors. 
  The outline of the paper is as follows. We first provide a brief literature review 
in Section 2 and we identify some key issues in natural resource incentive provision 
and regulation in Section 3. Next, we give a non-technical introduction to DEA in 
Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss why DEA has become so popular among 
regulators, as well as some of the main criticism that has been raised against the use of 
DEA for regulatory purposes. We then discuss earlier research on DEA based 
incentive plans, using this to suggest a reimbursement plan for natural resource 
management regulation in Section 6. In Section 7, we suggest that DEA can be used 
to evaluate and screen bids, rather than actual performances. We discuss how this 
could form the core of an auction design, e.g. when a government wants to procure 
forest and landscape qualities, reduce nitrogen leaching etc. Final remarks are provided 
in Section 8. 
 
2. Environmental Regulation 
  The theory of market-based instruments to enhance environmental benefits is 
growing. The theory originates from the traditional theory of economic incentives for 
environmental protection, cf. e.g. Baumol and Oates (1988) or Hanley et al (1997).  
  A significant body of research is concerned with problems in European and US 
agriculture. Intensive cultivation of the land conflicts with a  growing demand for 
public environmental goods. This increases the need for incentives. The literature 
focuses on the evaluation of existing schemes, cf. e.g. Shoemaker (1989), Whitby et 
al. (1998), Roberts et al. (1996), Vukina et al. (2000). It also contains more theretical 
contributions, e.g. Chambers (1997). 
  With hidden information and a high social value of environmental benefits, 
private landowners are in general overcompensated, i.e. the compensation they 
receive, exceeds the opportunity costs of producing the environmental benefits. The 
hidden information allows landowners with low opportunity costs, to imitate 
landowners with high opportunity costs. The extraction of such information rents can   3
be reduced by using auctions or yardstick competition or a combination thereof, as 
incentive mechanisms. 
  There is a large amount of literature on the theory and practice of auctions. 
Important theoretical contributions include Maskin and Riley (1984, 2000), McAffee 
and McMillan (1987) and Laffont and Tirole (1987), while Klemperer (1999) offers 
an overview. Within agriculture, studies on the use of auctions include Baneth (1995), 
Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort (1997, 1998) and Vukina et al. (2000). 
Auctions as incentive instruments are used in few cases, the most significant being an 
American set-aside scheme (CRP), Shoemaker (1989) and Vukina et al. (2000)).  
  There is also a great amount of literature on relative performance evaluations. 
This has been an important theme in the agency literature ever since the seminal 
contribution of Holmstrom(1982). Relative performance evaluation as yardstick 
competition was introduced by Shleifer(1985). The extension to multiple dimensional 
performances and the combination with frontier models like DEA was initiated in 
Bogetoft(1997,2000) and expanded upon in Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind(2002a,b). The 
uses of relative performance evaluations and yardstick schemes are numerous. 
Performance based payment schemes, where a manager’s bonus depends on his 
performance relative t o the sector or the market in general, is a prime example. 
Yardstick competition has, for example, been used to regulate transportation and 
electricity distribution, cf. Dalen and Gomez-Lobo(1997) Resende(2001). Similarly, 
elements of relative performance evaluation and yardstick competition are found in 
several production contracts in agriculture, see e.g. Bogetoft and Olesen(2002) and in 
particular Olesen(2002). 
  
3. Key Characteristics of Natural Resource Regulation 
  In most countries, the use of natural resources is heavily regulated. The 
regulatory aims range from the protection of endangered species to the assurance of 
reasonable incomes to farmers. Also, the regulatory means range from direct 
interference in works practices to more indirect monetary incentives. 
  At the general level, the regulatory motivations (externalities, market power etc) 
and tools (restrictions, subsidies, etc) hardly differ from one sector to another. This 
suggest that the regulatory innovations in one sector will find their way to other 
sectors as well. On the other hand, the different sectors may have particular 
characteristics that may motivate, if not new mechanisms, then at least a somewhat 
different mix of regulatory tools. 
  What then are some of the key characteristics of  the natural resource 
management sector? More precisely, and in line with the new economics of regulation 
as formulated in principal-agent settings, cf. Crew and Frierman(1991), 
Laffont(1994), or Laffont and Tirole(1993), we ask if the informational, preferential 
and technological characteristics of the natural resource management sector, make 
certain regulatory tools more appropriate than others? 
  In terms of information, some scholars have suggested that the sector is faced 
with extraordinary uncertainty from both production space (biology, weather etc) and 
the market place. The theoretical and empirical basis of this however, is not clear. 
Indeed, the conditions in many other sectors e.g. the financial and biotech sectors are 
very volatile as well.   4
  Others have emphasized the extreme degree of informational asymmetry. This 
seems a likely hypothesis given the diverse activities involved in many natural 
resource operations. It is a complex matter to characterize the cost function of a farm, 
for example, and it is likely, therefore, that external investors and regulators will be 
severely disadvantaged in terms of information about the local conditions faced by 
farmers. The ability farm managers have and the effort they make, is therefore 
difficult to infer. This may explain the survival of very small firms, e.g. family farms. 
  In terms of preferences, there is again non-trivial asymmetric information about 
what values the individual players may have. An agent’s personal value gained from 
working with animals, from creating beautiful landscapes or from protecting the 
environment, etc is hard to know and to measure. 
  Also, in many cases, there seem to be fuzzy social priorities and numerous 
potential conflicts between the stakeholders of natural resource management systems. 
It is for example, difficult or politically sensitive to make explicit trade offs between 
different generations, species, regions, etc. Since there are no markets for many of the 
goods produced, a single criterion of overall welfare cannot be constructed.  
Moreover, the preferences are most likely dynamic and contingent on the possibilities, 
i.e. the ability to reduce one or the other externality, will influence the values attached 
to the outcome. This creates the need for evaluation. 
  In terms of the technology, it clearly varies between agents facing different 
environmental conditions. Also, the natural resource production is characterized by a 
high degree of jointness. This means that the input or output we may want to regulate 
or incentivize, may affect the marginal products or costs of other inputs and outputs as 
well. To capture such dependencies, it is necessary to work with rather complex 
multiple input/multiple output production structures with easy and flexible allowance 
for non-controllable factors. 
  Last but not least, at the sector level, we typically have many “similar” units. 
This facilitates practical modeling. Also, it facilitates incentive provision by allowing 
for relative performance evaluations to reduce rents. In general, we also have large 
amounts of high quality data collected, using standardized natural science procedures. 
This makes the pure (idiosyncratic) noise elements less important than the uncertainty 
of the underlying structural relationship between inputs and outputs. 
  In the rest of this paper, we examine the design and usefulness of DEA based 
evaluations and incentives in such contexts with a complex technology, rather good 
data but considerable amounts of asymmetric information, unclear social priorities, 




4. Data Envelopment Analysis 
  In this Section, we provide a short, not too technical introduction to the main 
ideas and constructs in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  For a text-book 
introductions, see Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford (1994), Coelli, Rao and 
Battese(1998) or Cooper Seiford and Tone(2000).  
 
4.1. Rational Ideal Evaluations   5
  Consider the problem of evaluating a given production unit or production plan. 
In the DEA literature, the evaluated units, say the farmers or forestry estates, are 
usually called Decision Making Units (DMUs). One can think of the DMUs as actual 
organizational units, as production plans or more generally, as multiple dimensional 
performance descriptions at a given time. Note that there is no technical difference 
between times series and panel data in the DEA model. Past performances of a unit 
may therefore be used to evaluate current behavior.  
  A DMU transforms resources into products and services. The transformation is 
affected by non-controllable variables as well as non-observable skills and efforts in 
the organization. The  inputs in a farm could for example be the employees, the 
machinery, the buildings, the fields, the animals or the pesticides. The outputs might 
include the crops produced, the animals feeded, the sales revenue or indeed, the 
landscape preserved. The non-controllable variables will depend on the time horizon, 
etc. but could include large parts of the fixed costs, the weather conditions, the genetic 
health conditions of the herd and the market conditions. 
  Taking the standard micro-economic approach, we would ideally like to 
evaluate the performance of a given DMU by its ability to choose the best means to 
pursue its aims. The rational ideal performance evaluation can for example, be 
summarized by comparing the actually attained goal level to the maximum goal level 
that can be achieved. Figure 1 below illustrates this idea in the case of a fixed bundle 
of inputs and non-controllable variables. Here, the goal is U(.) and the possibilities are 
given by the set T. The effectiveness of DMU  D is evaluated by its obtained utility 




Figure 1 The Rational Ideal Evaluation 
 
  In real evaluations, it is not easy to apply the micro-economic cookbook recipe. 
In the typical evaluation, we lack clear priorities U as well as clear information about 
the production possibilities T. DEA provides a way of overcoming the informational 
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Figure 2 The Basic DEA Idea 
 
4.2 From Effectiveness to Efficiency 
  Consider first the lack of clear priorities as to how the resource spent and the 
products created, should be evaluated and traded-off against each other. In Figures 1 
and 2 this corresponds to a lack of information about the U function. The lack of 
priority information includes the problem of trading off the different benefits created 
by a landowner. DEA overcomes this problem by moving from an evaluation of 
effectiveness, i.e. goal attainment, to an evaluation of efficiency. Efficiency here is 
broadly defined as the production of the most outputs using the least inputs. The 
efficient plans in Figure 1 are all the plans on the north-east frontier. 
  To quantify the extent of inefficiency, the DEA literature uses different 
measures of the distance between a given DMU, say DMU  D, and the frontier of 
efficient plans. Most studies use the so-called Farrell(1957) measures that take into 
account the multiple dimensional character of the inputs and outputs by looking for 
proportional expansions and contractions. Thus the Farrell output and input based 
measures are: 
F  = largest proportional expansion of all outputs that are possible without using 
additional inputs 
 
E = largest proportional contraction of all inputs that are possible without 
reducing any output. 
 
Thus for example, F = 1.2 means that all output could be increased by 20%, while 
E = 0.6 means that all inputs could have been reduced with 40%. In Figure 1, the 
Farrell base output efficiency is approximately 200%, therefore all outputs could have 
been increased by 100% without introducing additional inputs, namely by moving 
from D to the Farrell projection plan F1.   7
  The resulting evaluations can also be interpreted in the following manner. The 
lack of a -priori information about priorities like  U in Figure 1 is overcome by 
choosing the priorities that puts the evaluated DMU in the best possible light. For 
DMU  D in Figure 1, this would be the priorities corresponding to the stipulated 
preference structure U
F. Hence, in DEA, each and every DMU is evaluated according 
to prices or priorities that make its effectiveness look as high as possible. The lack of 
knowledge about priorities is handled by allowing for all possible priorities, 
corresponding to all possible slopes of the indifference curves in Figure 1.  Of course, 
if some perhaps partial preference information is available, this can be used to refine 
the evaluations.  
 
4.3 From Absolute Efficiency to Relative Efficiency 
  Consider next the other fundamental problem in practice, namely the lack of 
sufficient a priori information about the underlying, potentially complex technology. 
In Figure 2 this corresponds to the set T and it reflects the technology in a broad 
sense, i.e. the socio-technical possibilities of transforming combinations of inputs into 
combinations of outputs. DEA overcomes this problem by estimating the technology 
T* from observed historical or cross-sectional actual plans. Performance is then 
evaluated relative to the performance of other DMUs, rather than relative to an 
absolute norm. 
  The idea of substituting an underlying but unknown production possibility set 
with an estimated one, is of course not unique to the DEA approach. It is also done in 
performance evaluations using traditional statistical methods, accounting approaches, 
etc. What is particular about the DEA approach, is the way the approximation of the 
technology is constructed and the resulting properties of the evaluations. 
  The technology is estimated using a so-called minimal extrapolation principle. 
By this we mean that DEA constructs the smallest possible set of production plans 
that constrain the observed ones and satisfy a set of (weak) regularity conditions. By 
constructing the smallest set containing the actual observations, the method 
extrapolates the least. 
  The minimal extrapolation idea is illustrated in Figure 2 by the set below the 
piecewise linear line. Effectiveness, if we know the priorities U, or efficiency F if we 
do not know U, can now be evaluated relative to T* rather than T. Since we evaluate 
compared to an empirical norm set by the other DMUs and since we do not compare 
to an absolute norm, we say that we evaluate relative effectiveness or efficiency. In 
the case of DMU D, the relative efficiency is now approximately 1.3, suggesting only 
a 30% improvement potential since we now compare to the point F2. 
  Different DEA models are distinguished by the set of production economic 
regularities imposed on the set T*.  They typically include some of the following 
 
A1: Free disposability, i.e. the ability to produce less outputs using less inputs 
A2: Convexity, i.e. the ability to make weighted averages of production plans 
A3: s-Return to scale, i.e. the ability to scale freely (crs), down (drs) or not (vrs). 
 
The four most commonly used DEA models are then the original constant returns to 
scale (crs) DEA model proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978, 1979) 
invoking A1, A2 and A3(crs), the decreasing returns to scale (drs) and (local) variable   8
returns to scale (vrs) models developed by Banker (1984) and Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (1984) with appeal to A1, A2 and A3(drs) and A1, A2 and A3(vrs), 
respectively, and the free disposability hull (fdh) model proposed by Deprins, Simar 
and Tulkens (1984) by invoking only A1. The resulting models in a single input 


































































Figure 3. The free d isposable hull (fdh), variable returns-to-scale (vrs), 
decreasing returns-to-scale (drs), and constant returns-to-scale (crs) technologies 
for DMU A, B, C, D, E. 
 
  In the multiple output case the vrs, drs and crs models could look like the T* 
technology in figure 2 while the fdh technology would correspond to a step-function 
between points A, B, C and E. 
  To understand the flexibility of the DEA approach, it is worthwhile noting that 
the fdh model simple assumes that production and cost functions are increasing. The 
vrs model simply assumes that production functions are increasing and concave and 
that cost functions are increasing and convex. The remaining models add the scaling 
possibilities, but even the crs model is much more flexible than a linear model (as 
soon as there are multiple inputs or outputs) 
  To summarize, DEA copes with two fundamental problems in real evaluations. 
The lack of clear preference or priority information is handled by moving from 
effectiveness to efficiency, while the lack of technological information a priori is 
handled by making weak a priori assumptions, by doing the estimation via the 
minimal extrapolation principle, and by evaluating efficiency relative to be best 
practice. Figure 2 above summarized the basic ideas. 
   9
4.4 Using Mathematical Programming to Assess Relative Efficiency. 
  To calculate the Farrell efficiencies in a realistic, many dimensional context, it 
suffices to solve simple linear programming (LP) problems. 
  Let us assume that we have for each of n production units, DMU
i, i=1,.., n, the 
following data available: The inputs used, perhaps just as costs, 
ip x ˛¡ , and an r-
dimensional environmental improvement vector, 
r y˛¡ . In addition, the regulator 
and the firms know a series of non-controllable, environmental variables 
q z˛¡ like 
the type of land, weather conditions, and distance to reservoirs, etc. In the 
formulations below, we model the non-controllable variables as inputs. 
Now, to formalize the basic ideas of DEA, we may think of an underlying, but 
unknown production possibility set  
{(,,)|(,) can produce }
pqr Txzyxzy
++
+ =˛ ¡  
The three classes of production economic regularities may then be formalized as 
 
A1: Free disposability: 
(,,),',''(',',') xzyTxxzzandyyxzyT ˛‡‡£￿˛ , 
A2: Convexity: 
(,,)(',',')(,,)(1)(',',')[0,1] xzyTogxzyTxzyxzyT aaa ˛˛￿+-˛"˛ , 
A3: s-Return to scale, 
(,,)(,,)() xzyTkxzykKs ˛￿"˛  
where s = "crs", "drs", "vrs" or "fdh", and where  ()[0,) Kcrs =¥ ,  ()[0,1] Kdrs = and 
()(){1} KvrsKfdh == . 
  Now, given the available data, the minimal extrapolation estimate of T, T
DEA, 
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Here,  ) (s L  is an index set that is determined from the reference technology 
and in particular from the axioms imposed hereon. In the vrs  technology, invoking 
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In the less demanding so-called fdh technology, invoking only free disposability of 
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  It follows that the Farrell input efficiency for DMU
i , i.e. the largest possible 
contraction of controllable inputs that is possible in given the estimated technology   10
T*, can be determined by solving a simple LP problem with n+1 variables and p+q+r 
(+1) constraints, see eg. Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford (1994), Coelli, Rao and 







































Observe that in the fdh case, the mathematical program is not actually an LP problem, 
but rather a mixed integer programming problem. In fact, the fdh problem can be solved 
much more easily by a series of straightforward pair-wise comparisons, cf. e.g. Deprins, 
Simar and Tulkens (1984). 
  In some cases, the non-controllable variables z, e.g. the climate conditions, are best 
thought of as an ordinal or even categorical variable, for which the idea of convexity and 
rescaling makes little sense. In this case, the DEA approach essentially operates by 
splitting the comprehensive evaluation program into a series of sub-problems 
corresponding to different values of the categorical variable, cf. eg.   Charnes, Cooper, 
Lewin and Seiford (1994), chapter 3. 
   
 
 
5. Pros and Cons of DEA 
  We have argued that relative performance evaluations and regulation are 
necessary in several sectors, including the natural resource sector. We have also 
described how DEA solves some of the fundamental problems in real evaluations, viz. 
the lack of preference and possibility information. We shall now look a little closer at 
some of the implied pros and cons of DEA. 
 
5.1 Pros 
  The way we estimate the production possibilities in DEA has several 
implications. 
  The use of the minimal set containing the actual points, suggest that DEA 
provides an inner approximation of the underlying production possibility set. The (in) 
efficiency estimates are therefore  cautious or conservative in the sense that the 
potential output expansions or input savings are underestimated. We have already 
seen this for DMU D in figure 1 where the expansion possibilities were estimated as 
30% with T* and 100% with T.  
  The use of the minimal extrapolation principle and hereby, the construction of 
the largest inner approximation, also implies that the technology identifies so-called 
best practice. This is attractive in many cases, since the methods and procedures of   11
the best units are more likely targets for other units. Thus, for example, if D in Figure 
1 is to learn, it would probably find little to learn from looking at F. It would be more 
interesting to look at what units like B and perhaps E have done differently. A further 
consequence of using the DEA approach is that real peers are identified. In Figure 1, 
D has two peers, B and E, since F2 is located on the line between these two units. B is 
the primary peer, since F2 is located close to B. Of course the construction of best 
practice norms, as opposed to average norms, must also influence the way we design 
incentive schemes. We shall return to this below. 
  The third and in many cases most important implication of the DEA estimation 
approach, is its ability to work with weak a priori assumptions and associated extremely 
flexible models of the technology. DEA models generally allow for the underlying best 
practice production structure to take many different forms. If we estimate a cost 
function using DEA for example, we may assume that it is simply any increasing 
function  – or any increasing convex function. We do not need to assume that the 
substitution possibilities between the outputs are fixed for example. No parametric 
statistical model or any cost function constructed by different accounting practices, 
allow for a similar flexibility in the technology model. There are many versions of the 
DEA approach, corresponding to the introduction of different combinations of a priori 
assumptions. In all cases, however, the imposed a priori regulatory is mild compared 
to competing approaches. 
 
5.2 Cons 
  The single most problematic feature of DEA is the risk of mistaking noise for 
efficiency or inefficiency, and the luckiest practice for the best practice. 
  If a DMU by chance faces particularly favorable circumstances that are not 
accounted for in the model, or if the registration of the outputs by luck (or intent) is 
biased upwards and the inputs downwards, the units will appear to have performed 
particularly well and have little if any inefficiency. Similarly, there is a risk of non-
favorable circumstances or registrations leading to groundless claims of inefficiency 
in a DEA analysis. The case of overly optimistic registrations is particularly 
problematic, since it might influence the evaluation of others that may now face 
tougher standards by being compared to a unit with a windfall gain. 
  These observations have lead theorists as well as practitioners to question DEA 
and advocate instead the use of statistical methods, including so-called stochastically 
frontier analyses SFA. SFA is like a traditional statistical model except that the noise 
is composed of two terms, a one-sided (in)efficiency term and a two-sided traditional 
noise term. 
  The appropriateness of DEA depends to a large extent on how well it is 
executed and in which contexts it is used. DEA is - similar to any other operations 
research technique - just a tool that can be used with success, if put in the right hands 
and used optimally. 
  To be  well executed, a DEA analysis must involve careful data collection, 
serious sensitivity analysis (using Monte Carlo techniques, peeling techniques, 
alternative technologies, etc), perhaps stochastic programming and if possible 
specification and significance testing. There are by now numerous contributions 
involving re-sampling, bootstrapping, and asymptotic test theory, cf. Simar and 
Wilson(2000) for a recent survey.  Still, the state of the art in this respect is still 
lacking compared to what can be done in parametric models.   12
  In terms of context, we note that in a regulatory context, it will often be at the 
regulator’s discretion how much inefficiency to eliminate in the coming periods. In 
such cases, by acting generously, the regulator may effectively create a safeguard 
against noise. Also, we note that given the flexibility in the production structure, 
individual noise or outlier problems may only have a local impact. Lastly but most 
importantly, we suggest that the impact of noisy registrations and mis-specified 
models, should also be viewed with the uncertainty about the underlying (average) 
production structure in mind. If we have very little a priori information about the 
technology and if it is potentially complex, the DEA approach may have clear 
advantages over parametric statistical methods and simple accounting models. 
  Intuitively, it would seem natural to conclude therefore that if one faces a simple 
technology and very noisy data, the use of parametrical, statistical models are 
preferable from an inference perspective. If on the other hand, we have relatively high 
quality data, but a complex  technology with considerable uncertainty about the 
structure of the input-output correspondences (the rates of substitution etc), DEA is 
preferred. More formal models of the pros of DEA in regulation with considerable 
structural uncertainty will be surveyed below. 
  A couple of more pragmatic observations are relevant here as well. DEA is easy 
to use given the existing computer implementations, the limited a priori assumptions 
needed and – somewhat counter intuitively – the lack of good standard indicators of 
mis-specified models! Also, DEA may be considered easy to defend. Again, this rests 
on the mild regularity assumptions, the ability to handle multiple inputs and outputs 
and the apparent ease of explaining DEA. Counter to these properties is the fact that 
the generation of explicit peers may not always be attractive. If for example a 
regulated firm questions the regulator’s decision in court, the existence of explicit 
peers make the regulator vulnerable, since it seems straightforward for the firm to find 
circumstances by which the regulated firm deviates non-favorably from the peer units. 
Using instead an econometric model, the exact basis of comparison becomes blurred, 
actually creating strategic advantages. Casual empiricism from the use of DEA in 
energy regulation, suggests that this is more than an academic possibility. Hence, 
although we do like the explicitness in the DEA analyses, we realize that in the less 
than ideal world of reality, even a black box approach may have its advantages. Also, 
the risk possibly entangling slack and noise, inefficiency and noise, may make the 
DEA approach harder to defend. 
  Another drawback of the DEA approach, as of efficiency studies in general, is 
the lack of focus on the goals of the organization. The impressing progress that can be 
made in the evaluation without much preference information, should not lead one to 
forget the importance of doing the right things and not just doing things right. It may 
be better to move slowly in the right direction than to run fast in the wrong direction. 
The importance and potential gains from giving more attention to preference 
modeling and less to the evaluation with possibly naïve priorities, has been 
emphasized in the multiple criteria literature, cf. e.g. Bogetoft and Pruzan(1991). 
Also, it has gradually been included into the DEA literature as well, c.f. e.g. Ali, Cook 
and Seiford(1991), Golany(1988a,b), Halme, Joro, Korhonen and Wallenius(1999), 
and Joro, Korhonen and Wallenius(1998). 
 
5.3 Summing Up   13
  To summarize our discussion, we have identified a series of pros and cons of 
DEA. The pros include 
• Requires no or little preference, price or priority information 
• Requires no or little technological information 
• Handles multiple inputs and multiple outputs 
• Provides real peers 
• Identifies best practice 
• Cautious or conservative evaluations (minimal extrapolation) 
• Supports learning and - as we shall argue in the next Section - planning and 
motivation 
and the cons include 
• Relatively weak theory of significance testing (sensitivity, resampling, 
bootstrapping, asymptotic theory) 




6. DEA and Incentives 
  We now give a brief introduction to some key results about incentive provision 
using DEA analysis. 
 
6.1 The Literature 
  The first conjectures as to the likely responses to DEA control, go back to 
Banker(1980) and Banker, Charnes, Cooper and Clarke (1989). They provided game 
theoretical interpretations of the scoring problem in the standard DEA models given 
realized inputs and outputs. 
  The study of the ex ante motivation game of choosing inputs, outputs, efforts, 
skills etc using formal agency models was initiated by Bogetoft(1990). It has 
subsequently been the subject of several papers and books including 
Bogetoft(1994a,94b,95,97,2000), and Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind(2002a,b). The main 
results concern the use of so-called super-efficiency, cf. Bogetoft(1990,1994a, 1994b 
and 1995), the design of static incentives with noise and risk adverse agents 
Bogetoft(1994b) and – as we shall focus on below -  the design of incentives for risk 
neutral agents in a context with considerable technological uncertainty and 
asymmetric information about a regulated agent’s actions (moral hazard) and working 
conditions (adverse selection), cf. Agrell and Bogetoft(2001) and 
Bogetoft(1997,2000), and in a dynamic setting Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind(2002a,b). 
  Similar ideas have been used in other studies, including Bowlin (1997)’s 
proposal for designing employment contracts for government managers, 
Dalen(1996)’s analysis of the interaction between performance measurement and 
bureaucratic slack, D alen, and. Gomez-Lobo(1997, 2001)’s cost estimation and 
yardstick analyses of buses, Resende (2001)’s study of yardstick competition in 
electricity distribution, Sheriff(2001)’s use of DEA in the design  of (agrarian) 
contracts, Thanassulis(2000)’s analysis of DEA and its use in the regulation of water 
companies and the Ph.D. dissertation by Wunsch(1995) on peer comparison and 
regulation of mass transit firms in Europe. 
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6.2 The Setting 
  The basic problem addressed in this literature is the following: Given a cross 
section, a time series or panel information on the multiple inputs and outputs of 
several DMUs, what should a manager, a regulator or an owner ask the DMUs to do 
in the future, and how should he motivate and compensate the DMUs for their effort 
and other private costs ? 
  The answer to these questions depends intimately on the organizational context 
and in particular on the technological, informational and preferential assumptions of 
the parties, i.e. the regulator (principal) and DMUs (agents). 
  In general, we consider the case where the principal (regulator) faces 
considerable uncertainty about the technology. In a single input multiple output cost 
setting, he may for example know that the cost function is increasing and convex, but 
otherwise have no a priori information about the cost structure.  
  The general case also empowers agents to take  private actions, which the 
principal cannot observe. The action could for example be to reduce costs or increase 
the quality of the work. This leads to the usual moral hazard problem since the 
principal and the agents may conflict as to which actions the agents should take. The 
traditional setting depicts the agents as work averse, tempted to rely on their good 
luck and to explain possibly bad performances with unfavorable circumstances. In 
general, however, it is simply one way to model the underlying conflicts giving rise to 
a motivation problem.  
  Usually, we also consider the possibility that the agents have  superior 
information about the working conditions, before contracting with the principal. A 
farmer may for example have good information about the production conditions on 
his land and therefore the likely loss in crop revenue from reduced N application. The 
regulator trying to reduce N-usage, on the other hand, may have little information 
about the cost at a specific farm. This leads to the classical adverse selection problem, 
where an agent will try to extract information rents by claiming to be operating under 
less favorable conditions. 
  As regards the preference of the parties, we generally assume that the principal 
is risk neutral and that the agents are either risk averse or risk neutral. The principal’s 
aim is to minimize the costs of inducing the agents to take the desired (hidden) actions 
in the relevant (hidden) circumstances. An agent’s aim is usually to maximize the 
utility from payment minus the disutility from private effort.  
  The general set-up and timeline is illustrated in Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4.   Agency Structure with Timeline of Events. 
 
 
6.3 DEA based Yardstick Theory 
  In Bogetoft(1997,2000), we consider the combined adverse selection and moral 
hazard context. We assume  – in the simplest possible version  - that the only 
observable  input is the realized costs, i.e. the input is one-dimensional 
, 1,..,
ii xcin =˛= ¡ . The question is how much, B, to reimburse a DMU using costs 
c to produce
r y˛¡ with environmental (non-controllable) variables 
q z˛¡ . 
  In terms of technology and information, we assume that there is considerable 
uncertainty and asymmetric information about the underlying cost structure. The 
DMU is supposed to have superior technological information. In an extreme case, it 
knows with certainty the underlying true cost  
(;) Cyz 
i.e. the costs of producing y under environmental conditions z.. Of course, we do not 
have to assume that the DMU knows these costs for all possible output profiles y and 
environmental conditions z. In fact, it will ease the design of good schemes if it only 
has local information, say the costs for a limited set of possible output vectors and 
given its specific local conditions. 
  The regulator, on the other hand, only knows the general  nature of the cost 
function a priori, say that 
(.;.):
rp C
+ ﬁ ¡¡  
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where C(.;.) being crs means that C(ky;kz)=kC(y;z) for all  0 k ‡  and C(.;.) being drs 
means that C(ky;kz)=kC(y;z) for all 10 k ‡‡. In addition, the regulator knows that the 
realized productions plans are possible, i.e. that 
(;),  1,..,
iii xCyzin ‡=  
  We note that the analysis below can be undertaken using different assumptions 
about the information available to the regulator. Thus for example, the regulator may 
know that there are fixed unit costs of the different outputs, but be uninformed about 
the exact unit costs, cf. Bogetoft(2000). Also, the classes of possible cost functions 
could be extended, cf. Bogetoft(1994a,1997). 
  In terms of preferences, we assume that the DMU is risk neutral and has limited 
liability, and that it seeks to maximize a weighted sum of profit and slack. The risk 
neutrality is a simplification compared to for example Bogetoft (1994a,b). Assuming 
that the incentive payments only introduce marginal variations, however, it is not an 
invalidating assumption. Moreover, the DMU’s liability is assumed to be limited in 
the sense that it will only participate in the schemes if the resulting utility exceeds a 
minimum value, Q, with certainty. This may reflect risk aversion as well. 
  The DMU’s resulting utility is assumed to be the utility from payment and 




when it uses costs c to produce y with environmental variables y and is reimbursed B. 
The first term, B-c, is the profit. The second term is the excess costs or slack, c-C(y;z), 
multiplied by the value of slack compared to profit, r. 
  The aim of the regulator is simply to minimize the costs of inducing the DMU 
to produce output y in the context of z. 
  Assuming that the realized costs c, outputs y and environmental variables z are 
all verifiable, the regulator’s problem for any given output vector y and any given 
environment z, is one of minimizing the expected costs of making the agent accept 
implement y given z. This can be formulated as one of designing a (x,y,z) contingent 
reimbursement plan B(x,y,z) that solves the following contract design problem 
 
Min     [((,,),,)] C EBxCyzyz  
(.,.,.) x  
s.t 
       .
((,,),,)(,,)[(,,)(;)]





                    (IR)          17










In this problem, x(C,y,z) is the cost level chosen by the DMU when the cost function 
is C, the output is y and the environmental variables are z. This is a usual contract 
design problem, where the individual rationality constraint (IR) ensures that the DMU 
will participate for all possible cost functions, while the incentive compatibility 
constraint (IC) ensures that it is a best response for the DMU to pick cost strategy 
x(.,.,.) and produce y with environmental variables z. 
  If some of the variables (c,y,z) can not be contracted upon, additional constraints 
may be introduced. Thus, for example, if the actual costs c is non-verifiable, we 
impose  (,,)(,)  BxyzByzx =" . 
  The solution to this problem can be derived following the lines in 
Bogetoft(2000), extended by the introduction of the non-controllable environmental 
inputs z. Let C








































where s=crs, drs, vrs or fdh depending on the regulator’s assumed a priori knowledge 
about the class of underlying costs functions. (This problem may not have feasible 
solutions. Ways to deal with this are discussed in Bogetoft(1997, 2000).) 
  Now, when the actual costs cannot be contracted upon,  (,,)(,)  BxyzByzx =" , 
the optimal solution is to use the following revenue cap with non-verifiable cost 
information: 
 
 B(y,z) =  Q + C
DEA (y;z) 
 
i.e. the optimal reimbursement equals a lump sum payment to cover the reservation 
utility, Q, plus the DEA-estimated cost norm for the given output y and environmental 
variables z. 
  If instead, we assume that the actual costs of the DMU can be contracted upon, 
the optimal reimbursement scheme becomes 
 
B(c,y,z)= Q + c+ r•( C
DEA(y;z) – c) 
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i.e. the optimal reimbursement equals a lump sum payment, Q, plus the actual costs, c,  
plus a fraction r of the DEA-estimated cost savings, r•( C
DEA(y;z) – c). 
  The structure of this payment scheme can be interpreted as a DEA based 
yardstick model: Using the performance of the other DMUs, the regulator creates a 
cost yardstick and the regulated DMU is allowed to keep a fraction r of his saving 
compared to the yardstick costs as his effective compensation. Figure 5 illustrates this 
reimbursement scheme.  
  Several extensions and generalizations of these results are possible. Most 
significantly, we show in Bogetoft(1997) how the above setting can be extended to a 
simultaneous game among multiple DMUs in the spirit of traditional yardstick 
competition, cf. Shleifer (1985). The contract design problem in this case becomes a 
multiple agents model, where the (IC) constraints define a Bayesian equilibrium 
among the agents. Assuming verifiable costs information, the resulting yardstick 
scheme is like the one above. For a given DMU, one just needs to interpret the DEA 
based cost function as the cost model that can be derived ex post from the observation 
of the other units. This corresponds to the use of so-called super-efficiency in a usual 
DEA model, cf. also Bogetoft(1997). Hence, in the simultaneous yardstick model, the 
regulator commits himself a priori to making a DEA super-efficiency evaluation ex 
post, and to let this evaluation determine the revenue to the DMUs. 
  In Bogetoft(1997), we also show how to extend the yardstick setting to cases, 
where the regulator can observe more detailed input consumptions and possibly different 
factor prices. In this case, the DEA cost function used above, shall simply be derived 







-- =˛  
 
where 
i w is the factor prices for DMU
i, and  T
DEA-i is the DEA approximation of the 
technology based on detailed data from all units except unit i. 
  In Bogetoft (2000), we also show how the structure of the optimal scheme is 
essentially unaffected by introducing decentralized decision making (where the DMU, 
e.g. the forest owners, decide on the output mix), as well as participatory budgeting 
arrangements (where non-verifiable costs estimates are communicated a priori).  
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Figure 5.   The DEA Yardstick Model in the Production-Cost Space. 
 
  In Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind(2002a,b), we introduce a time dimension in the 
yardstick model. The dynamic perspective gives rise to several new issues. One is the 
possibility of accumulating and using new information. Another, is the need to avoid 
the ratchet effect, i.e. deliberate sub-performance in early periods to avoid facing 
standards that are too tough in the future. 
  Nevertheless, the structure of the optimal dynamic scheme is similar to the ones 
developed above. Thus, the optimal revenue cap for a DMU is found as a DEA based 
yardstick norm. Assuming verifiable actual costs, the optimal scheme taking into 
account the generation of new information, the ratchet effect and the possibility of 
technical progress becomes: 
 
Bt(ct,yt,zt) = Q + ct + r•( C
DEA
1-t (yt,zt) – ct) 
 
i.e. the optimal reimbursement  to the DMU in period t, Bt(ct,yt,zt), equals a lump sum 
payment, Q, plus actual costs in period t,  ct , plus a fraction r of the DEA-estimated 
cost savings in period t,  r•( C
DEA
1-t (yt,zt) – ct), using all the information from  the 
other DMUs generated in periods 1 through t.  
  In Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind(2002a,b), we also consider how to modify the 
schemes to take into account  the possibly of limited catch-up capacity, i.e. the fact 
that it may take time for a DMU to learn the best practice, and the possible cost of 
innovation (frontier movements). 
  We close this Section by noting that the use of yardstick schemes is not new to 
farmers. Elements of yardstick competition have long been part of existing production 
contracts. Yardstick competition in these contracts, however, is typically introduced to 
cope with a single aspect, say the impact of sowing time or feed quality, cf. Bogetoft 
and Olesen(2002) and Olesen(2002) for recent and rather advanced examples. To the 
best of our knowledge, however, the use of multiple dimensional yardstick schemes 
like the ones suggested have not previously been part of the natural resource 
management literature. To the extent that multiple dimensional aspects have been 
dealt with, it has been done by introducing a common aggregation of the different 
dimensions a priori, rather than by using agent specific, endogenous aggregations as it 
is implicitly done in the DEA approach.   20
 
7. DEA and Procurement Auctions 
  In the traditional DEA literature, the focus is on the evaluation of past 
performances using past production data. In the DEA-incentive literature, the focus is 
on the use of historical or future production data to monitor the agents and to motivate 
them to take proper actions by committing ex ante to a payment principle ex post. 
  We now introduce a third potential use of DEA, namely to evaluate non-realized 
multi-dimensional bids (as opposed  to realized production plans) in a procurement 
setting (as opposed to a control setting). In particular, we suggest that an allocation and 
price setting mechanism along the lines of the DEA based yardstick schemes, can be a 
useful generalization of a second price sealed bid auction mechanism. 
 
7.1 Multi-Dimensional Auctions 
  Although there are many practical instances of multidimensional auctions, e.g. the 
conservation reserve program in the USA, cf. eg. Vukina et al (2000), and the 
Department of Defence procurement auctions for weapon systems in the USA, cf. e.g. 
Che(1993), the theoretical literature on multi-dimensional auctions is sparse. 
  In a standard auction or procurement context, where a single quality product is 
supplied, the revenue equivalence between first price and second price auctions is the 
most central result. It was suggested by Vickrey (1961), but remained a puzzle until 
1981 where Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Myerson (1981) simultaneously solved 
the problem. They show that in an independent private value model, the different 
mechanisms give the same expected revenue (or costs) to the principal. 
  Che (1993) shows how the existing theory can be  generalized to 
multidimensional auctions. He considers allocating contracts containing a price p and 
a one-dimensional quality parameter  q. The principal’s utility function is 
(,)() UpqVqp =- , where  () Vq is a concave function that values quality. An agent 
DMU
i that wins a contract earns profit  (,)(,)
i
i pqpcq pq =- , where p is the price he 
is paid, q is the quality he must deliver,  i q  is his type and  (,) i cqq is his costs of 
producing quality  q. The principal selects a quasi-linear score function: 
(,)() Spqsqp =- . The agents with highest scores are offered a contract. The exact 
terms of the contracts depend on which mechanism is chosen. Che(1993) considers 
two different mechanism: 
 
• First score auction - the bidder with the highest score win and the winner have 
to meet the highest score. A first score auction can be compared with the first 
price auction. 
• Second score auction - the bidder with the highest score win and the winner 
have to meet the second highest score. A score auction can be compared with 
the second price auction. 
 
He shows an equivalence theorem for the two types of score auctions. Both auctions 
are optimal second best mechanisms. 
  
7.2 DEA-Based Procurement   21
  We now propose a DEA based procurement scheme that generalizes the second 
price scheme to a multiple dimensional context. It leads to truthful revelation of costs 
and works with a broad class of underlying cost functions like the DEA based 
yardstick scheme. 
  We consider a principal who wants one or more of  n agents or DMUs to 
improve the environment. To determine which agents to call upon and the 
compensation to award them, the regulator organizes a multiple dimensional, multiple 
unit procurement auction. Initially, the agents submit bids, and based hereon, the 
regulator determines which offers to use and how to compensate the corresponding 
agents. Next, the agents pick the actual production plans, including slack, and 
payment is realized when the promised outputs are delivered. 
  A bid from DMU
i is now an r-dimensional environmental improvement vector 
ir y ˛¡ and a cost 
i c ˛¡. In addition, a series of non-controllable variables 
iq z ˛¡  
like type of land, distance to reservoir, etc. is common knowledge to the agents and 
the regulator. The underlying costs of producing y
i in the context of z
i,  (;)
ii Cyz, is 
private information to the agents. The regulator simply knows that the costs originate 
from a common cost function C(.;.) from a class  () s £ , where s = crs, drs, vrs or fdh. 
  To keep things simple at this stage, we assume that DMU
i can only choose one 
production plan y
i. Also, we assume that the production plans y=(y
1,…,y
n) and non-
controllable context or state variables z=(z
1,…,z
n) can be perfectly verified and hence 
costlessly contracted upon. (In a generalized setting, each DMU
i will have a whole set 
Y
i of technically feasible production plans given its other activities and each  DMU
i 
will submit multiple bids corresponding to the different productions in Y
i). 
  We assume that the agents are risk neutral and that they maximize profit and 
slack with a relative value r of slack compared to profit. That is, when  DMU
i gets 
compensated B
i for producing y
i and when he actually uses (x
i,z







  Also, we assume that the regulator maximizes the value of environmental gains 
U(.,…,.) minus the costs of inducing the agents to undertake the production. The costs 
needed to pay the agents are inflated with  (1+k)>1, to reflect the economy wide 
misallocations resulting from the generation of the necessary funding via tax 
payments.. 
  Before formalizing the regulator’s problem, we note that the cost (types) of the 
different DMUs are correlated. We know that the actual costs of the DMUs all 
originate from the same underlying cost function. The set of possible cost functions, 
however, is very large. This means that types are not perfectly correlated. On the other 
hand, they are also not independent. We argue that the assumed correlation is very 
natural by its relationship to production theory. The underlying cost function may be 
interpreted as the long run cost function while the costs of the individual DMUs may 
be thought of as originating from local, short run cost curves.  
  We will now formalize the regulator’s problem, suggest a procurement 
procedure and discuss the basic properties of the procedure. 
  To do so, we introduce decision variable d
i, i=1,..,n to reflect which agents are 
actually selected to produce the desired outputs,  {{1,..,}|1}
i ind ˛= , and which are 
not,  {{1,..,}|0}
i ind ˛= . Note that in general, the decision variables will depend on 
all the bids of all the agents,  (,,)
ii ddcyz = . Using the revelation principle, we can   22
without loss of generality impose truth-telling constraints, i.e. assume that the costs 
reported by DMU
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  The objective function is the expected environmental value minus social costs. 
Expectation is taken with respect to the underlying, unknown costs, c, to the DMUs of 
producing the outputs. The regulator’s choice variables concern which DMUs to 
accept in the program, d, and what to pay, B. In addition, the regulator must predict 
the actual costs that the accepted agents will use, x. The first set of constraints is the 
individual rationality constraints. They ensure that all DMUs, given their private 
information about their costs, expect to get at least their reservation utility of Q
i if they 
are selected. Note that in the chosen formulation, we assume that the DMUs only 
know their own costs, not the costs of the other DMUs. The second set of constraints 
is the usual incentive compatibility constraints. They say that no agent would ever like 
to deviate from truth-telling about costs, c
i, and from choosing actual costs according 
to x
i.  
  Consider now the following DEA based procurement auction to deal with this 
problem: 
 
Stage 1: Bidding 
The DMUs submit (cost, context, output) bids (ci, z
i, yi), i=1,..,n 
 
Stage 2: Cost Norms 





i) is determined, based on the bids of the other units 




































Stage 3: Selection 
The regulator selects DMUs by solving 
 
111222- max   ((,), (,), .., (,)) - (1)((;))










    
 
Stage 4: Payment 
If DMU







  The idea of this procedure is simple. T he regulator uses the bids from the 
bidding round to estimate DEA based cost norms for the individual DMUs. Using 
these cost norms, the regulator then makes the necessary trade-offs between the 
environmental benefits and the costs of acquiring them. Finally, the payments to the 
selected DMUs are settled as the DEA estimated cost norms plus reservation utilities 
just like in the yardstick competition model with non-verifiable actual costs. 
  The DEA based procurement auction gives a feasible and cost efficient solution 
to the regulator’s procurement problem. To see this, assume truthful cost revelation to 
all DMUs but  DMU
i. It follows from the minimal extrapolation principle that 
(;)(;)
iiDEAiii CyzCyz
- £ . Now, since the value of slack is less than 1, the best 
response of DMU
i is to choose  (;) and (;)
iiiiii cCyzxCyz == , i.e. to reveal the true 
costs and to produce outputs at least possible costs. We therefore have that the 
suggested scheme is 1) individually rational and 2) incentive compatible. Moreover, 
we note that the resulting solution is 3) cost efficient in the sense that no DMU would 
like to introduce slack in the final production plan.  
  Also, the DEA based procurement auction will  sometimes be an optimal 
solution to the regulator’s procurement problem. To see this, consider a case with 
considerable environmental benefits B such that we would ideally like all DMUs to 
produce the environmental goods. In such cases, it cannot be part of an optimal 
solution to ration production, i.e. to forgo production in some cases, i.e. for some cost 
types, to make production for other cost types cheaper. Now, to make sure that it is 
individually rational for all to produce under all possible cost functions, we cannot 




i)  since for some cost types, we will have Q






i).  Therefore, if he was paid anything less, it would not be a 
best response to accept the offer. Since other cost types can imitate this one, no one 
can be paid anything less than Q
i+ CDEA-i(y
i;z
i), i.e. the solution is optimal when 
rationing cannot be accepted. 
  Finally, we suggest that the DEA based procurement auction will often be near-
optimal. To see this, note that the DEA approximation of the cost structure will 
provide a close fit in many  cases. Having observed n-1 observations on the C(.;.) 
curve, the piecewise linear approximation will typically not deviate too much for 
points close to the observed ones. (If every DMU could submit multiple bids, the 
approximation would even improve). 
   The DEA based schemes above can of course be extended in several directions. 
In particular, one could combine the initial bidding with an ex-post evaluation and 
verification of actual costs using a yardstick scheme like in the previous section. Also, 
to save on the information rents, it may be attractive for a regulator with not overly 
large benefits to ration away some production. As suggested in Bogetoft(1997), the 
optimal rationing procedure would correspond to including artificial plans in the 
estimation of the DEA cost norms. We leave such extensions to future research. 
 
 
8. Final Remarks 
  In this paper, we have discussed the pros and cons of using Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) to evaluate and enhance the efficiency of natural resource 
management. 
  Natural resource management problems often involve complex production 
structures, with joint production of multiple products simultaneously. Moreover, there 
are non-trivial inputs to the production process that cannot be controlled. There are 
also non-trivial  elements of asymmetric information about the conditions and 
preferences of the different landowners. Last but not least, there are often several 
entities performing similar operations and this allows the recording of relatively good 
and detailed data on practices in a large number of units. The DEA modeling is 
particular useful in these circumstance because of its ability to handle multiple inputs 
and outputs, to work with flexible production structure, to incorporate local variables, 
and to work with limited or no preference information.  Moreover, the need in DEA 
for good data from several, similar units is often possible to fulfill. 
  To cope with delegated production and incentive problems, the DEA approach 
can also be useful. We reviewed some basic results on DEA based incentive schemes. 
These schemes can be used in motivating landowners to take desired decisions, e.g. to 
reduce N-leaching. Finally, we indicated how a DEA based procurement procedure 
could be used to select farmers and forest-owners for a program, e.g. to enhance 
environmental qualities. 
  There are several, relevant extensions of the research reported here. We suggest 
that future research should focus in particular on the development of multi- 
dimensional procurement auctions. The discrepancy between practical ad hoc 
procedures in coping with multiple dimensions and the simplified, usually single 
dimensional theoretical models, is particularly striking. We believe that developments 
along the lines of the DEA based auctions may lead to new approaches that can solve 
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